One should understand the following paragraphs not as a developed theory with the standard of objective truth and neutrality, but with the polemic aspiration of theory as a tool to seek out what reality is, in the sense of what _only_ it is. Theory is often, wrongly, understood in the position of revealing; but really, no big revelations are to be expected from theoretical treatises; they're no exposés. Their power is in stating the obvious - however, an obvious that is obvious only after it is being stated (as is said about proofs in Math). That "obviousness" makes theory as such hidden, invisible for those who are practicing it. This is why it is often confused with "theoretical texts", that is with texts discussing critically such theoretical presumptions. Such a theory - a theory about theory and its truth, often called objectivity - is not what I want to lay out here; but only that theory itself; and leave its critical discussion to a later point. (Although, elements of justification will sometimes creep back in, that cannot be completely prevented.) This should at least give a better text, one shorter of the justification of the justification of the .. and so on, that is typical for those texts, which need to, in their first paragraph, justify that indeed, they may begin the text. (This paragraph can be seen as such one, but it will hopefully not repeated for every sentence.)
So what do I understand with that difference? I come here originally from the question of studying plurality, and personal identity more generally, but plurality is the best example. Plural systemhood is in a sense something psychological, but also something social. But it is neither exactly. Obviously, plural systems aren't social systems; they don't exist outside one body. This is pretty obvious. But it is also not true that they are psychological systems. With psychological systems I mean things like: breathing; sensation via the five senses; eating and apetite; language; motivation etc. Those are clearly in some sense things that are "had" by a psyche; they are functionally differentiated in the same way the economic, political and medical system are in society. But the "plural system" is none of these. Indeed, if it would be one of them, it would create strange effects. What is the overlap of a certain subsystem of a multi-fragmented system, with the system of language acquisition? It is obvious that this is an absurd question. These "systems" are not systems in the same meaning of the word. And in the same way that psychological systems are not social systems - that they are different specifications of a system (with differentiation of inside and outside, autopoiesis etc.) - plural systems are also a different specification of a system in general, or are an example of such a general category; this category shall further be called "subjective systems" for reasons later explained. I deem it to lie between social and psychological systems, so that we have a hierarchy: physicho-chemical systems - biological systems - psychological systems - subjective systems - social systems; with the substantial basis of the material mixture, the organism, the psyche, the person and the society; with their interactional basis (as these "substances" are essentially, by definition, processes) the reaction, life/growth, perception/apetition, (self-)consciousness, and communication.
The author which to me here is a great help is Luhmann and his theory of social systems; I especially like his understanding, that social systems are essentially processes of communication. That means, that the economic system of society is _only_ the interaction of payments; not the people making them; the political system is only the votes, the scientific system only published results/papers etc. This theory however is presented typically in the style of a discovery, or insight; I will take it as a kind of irony, as understanding, that is not free of the knowledge that is was at least partially disappointing. This reconnection to theory as not the reflection on theory, but as a tool to see the absurdity of the world, takes us away from the position of contemplation. A such modified Luhmannian theory cannot still be sociology then; it becomes social humour, but theoretically reflected. I still know way too little about the Luhmannian theory to do it justice in this; and one can see the way I use it therefore more a specific kind of use of fragments, of terms here and there, as a tool to see something. The scarcity of the basis of my understanding is partly the reason of the caution I use to not claim more than I know, to assure myself to the reader that I am infact also somewhat dumb, and not to be trusted on this; the other part of the reason is precisely the arrogance one can use for that - to say it and still say one didn't really say it! But so over ironized this all becomes impotent; and hopefully to you only a warning that I don't intend to recreate this theory in the same way; that my way of extending it is also a transformation, and not really a just one. - (This all will be later more clear when I come back to what I think communcation actually is...)
But enough of that; why do I even consider this theory, besides the fact I had the books on my shelfs for a time long enough I could be embarrassed into actually reading them? It goes back to the theory of plural systematicity. I noticed, when thinking about them, that the angle of sociological analysis, although obvious, is never present. A lot of systems call themselves "collectives"; many psychologists even see them as "family systems"; but their understanding remains on the psychologist's approximation of sociology, not taking into account actual terms of social systems as would be necessary. In fact, the term "system" there refers, in a lot of understanding, to a _psychological system_; the "family system" to the obviously false notion that there is a common psychological system between family members, instead of their _communication_ - the systemic analysis really would say that the family is nothing but the way the family members talk to each other; that this objective family dynamic is the social system, and that the various intentions, desires, interpretations etc. on the part of their members really belong into psychological systems, (or subjective systems - they are not much distinguished from the sociological viewpoint), but not in a "family system", instead belonging to their respective intention-havers etc, and only their _communication_ actually belonging to the family. - If we in this way see that, especially in the view of the importance of system communication, an adoption of the Luhmannian theory might be useful, it is simultanously obvious that it can't be directly applied. System communication is not really identical to communication between people of different bodies; there are things involved like memory sharing, and of self-experience, not really only linguistic contents. But it is also clear that system communication is much closer to social communication than to external experience; so that such a thing as a subjective system should be in between.
That only for the motivation. Now I actually can begin laying down my principles (as you see, I indeed needed more justification; but that's true even here - definitions are justifications of their use; texts are justification of their interpretation etc; it is just that I hope not to be too dragged down by the continued investment in the understanding of the text as a text):
1. Subjective systems are systems of communication of consciousness. A subjective system can consist of various sub systems, that are based on different kinds of subjective understanding, or of related systems of a similar kind. Their common element is that of consciousness. In the same way that a social system ceases to exist when ways of communication are cut off, subjective systems cease to exist in case of loss of consciousness, for exactly the time length of that loss.
2. The first differentiation of any system is of itself and its outside environment; that is, between the self and the non-self. This is, in the form of consciousness, self-consciousness or personal identity vs. the consciousness of the other or personal difference and perception; hence, the differentiation of various subsystems of a subjective system then create the process of personal differentiation, sometimes also known as "splitting", as a process of mutual perception and othering, of both the self and the other, against each other.
3. Subjective systems don't have to be differentiated functionally, or temporally; they can be structured in all sort of ways, even when there are more typical ways of such structuring. In a sense, the differences under the banner of "neurodivergence", even outside of plurality, often refer to anomalous subjective, not psychological or biological systems, although overlap is obviously also present here. The first importance here is to understand the various functional elements of a subjective system, independent of if they also experience functional differentiation or merely copresence of such functions in one or more (sub)systems of the subjective system.
4. These different functional elements derive from the different functions of the psychological systems on which the subjective system basis its conduct of consciousness. That is, the conscious system of body-perception, and all the various elements of relationship to the body - including dysphoria and dysmorphia, acceptance and difference, creation of internal bodily images in the inner world etc. - are based on the psychological systems of sensation in various organs and their unconscious systems for breathing and heart rates etc.; the conscious system of language and meaning and the identities put behind our attachment to this or the other language, and words of choice to identify, are based on the unscious system of language acquisition and psychological basis of assuming words mean anything at all (that is then related to social system, via means of this conscious externalization, as well as by the interaction of other conscious systems with the unconscious systems relating to language); the conscious systems of memory, of biographical stories and internally percieved age etc, are based on the unconscious systems of memory perception in dreams or based on smells etc; and so on. All subjective systems, with other words, take their _material_ from psychological systems; but the way they conceptualize it is drastically different from them, and can even be in opposition to them (as is obvious in the cases of dysmorphia or of repression of traumatic memories, where the psychological systems represent immediate elements that are rejected by the systems of subjective reflection and self-conception).
5. Importantly, however, those psychological elements are _not even present_ in the subjective system. Body image is not about the perception of breathing etc, but it is _of_ it, derives from it in a symbolic sense, makes it into a symbol. In reference to the sociological theory we can say, that the psyche is only _in the environment_ of the subject, but not the subject itself. This is then also the way, in which those who try to see the self in the brain are wrong; in that they in fact overlook two whole steps of seperation of functions (the psychological from the biological, and the subjective from the psychological).
6. Consciousness however does not merely take something as an "object" by a fancy; it needs to. I think we need to heed to the phenomenological insight, that consciousness is always consciousness-of, on this layer; not as a psychological or socio-linguistic question, but in between, as a subjective question. This does both agree with the Husserlian aversion to psychologism (as indeed would be wrong about subjective systems), but still criticizes the aspect, that is sometimes visible in Husserl and esp. later (post-)structuralist Husserlians, to sociologize intentionality. Intentionality here is as much as communication is in Luhmannian sociology, an inherent quality of the system, a kind of operation, not a kind of "action", but also precisely _not_ a form of communication. The linguistic phenomenon of intentionality is only one example of it, but crucially that one, which leads us to study sociological intentionality, or communication, also.
7. Here we now come to the polemics about sociology - and I really can't avoid the polemic element here, as much as it might be appropriate. The basic premise here is that language is _always_ a private language, but can't be; the Wittgensteinian prohibition becomes a dialectics. I have my interpretation of language, or any other symbolic action; that is a _conscious_ content, shared within this system of communication in consciousness, with me and my headmates. But then, when I communicate externally, I say a word or more, nothing more. There is no "meaning" in the word, because this word already exited the system in which it was associated with it - the subjective system - and lost its intentional object. On the other side, another system might observe it; if it is a technical system like a chat bot, nothing more happens, for that also only deals with syntax, not semantics; but if that is a subjective system, there is a problem. Consciousness needs to be consciousness-of; the word needs to gain an intentional object. So what to do? Simply: just associate one with it! This is then called "interpretation", and is often done by one's own expectations of when one would use the word themselves. So, it appears now that a word with intentionality was communicated; but was it? It didn't - only the word was communicated, not its intentional object, not its actual meaning! But since I can't imagine this consciousness but with its interpretation, I automatically assume the other has this meaning too. This is the basic form of any _conversation_. A _communication_ now is further defined by the following three traits:
a) That there is a conversation, as described, where each side has their intentions and interpretations;
b) That both sides assume that their intentions get correctly interpreted, and that their interpretations of the other persons intentions are also correct; and
c) Most importantly: that the conversation would not have even happened in the first place without this assumption in place.
Importantly, b) is always a misunderstanding, as we have seen; but this does not mean it's a miscommunication; this can still work out, even if it's not exactly correct. For example: when I tell a roommate to bring potatoes from the store, I have my understanding of the word "potato", and the roomate has theirs. We also both intuitively expect them to match up, even if we on reflection would agree that they might differ. The important reason why this falls under my definition of "communication" is, that if we have a debate about what our definition of "potato" is, we fail to actually have something to eat; the success of communication lies in ignoring this necessary difference and go with our interpretation to some extent. The drive to avoid misunderstandings is therefore one that creates miscommunications, in the sense that the communication doesn't even work out to begin with. Obviously however, there also _are_ miscommunications based on this misunderstanding; but they are not about this fundamental misunderstanding, that our ideas of "potato" differ, but that we fail to even agree on empirical examples to have some reasonable space of misunderstanding (where we refer to the same aisle in the super market, even if we would come up with different essential definitions, if we aren't accidentaly both botanists).
The secund presumption about sociology, that I make, is that the functional differentiation of the systems of society on the macro level goes along the ways of the differentiation of different types of these misunderstandings or communications on the micro level. For example: the difference between the political and the economic system on the macro level corresponds to the difference of betrayel and scam on the micro level. Betrayel is the difference between promise and action; it happens, in the political sphere, because we can only really see outward "actions" - votes, or support for slogans - and then interpret them in a certain way; we interpret them as a promise. However, the point is, that even if the politician I voted for would do the same things I wanted, they might still do them for an entirely different reason. There is a structural betrayel on this level, where there simply cannot be politics without me being betrayed in what I want; and importantly, that is calculated into political action. My voting decision depends on me believing that it impacts something; seeing it simply _as a vote_ without transmitted intentionality makes it meaningless, almost pointless. One can still, in a very calculated way, cast the ballot; but one is inherently alienated from the whole thing, when the attitude is, that it won't affect much, and might even go the other way, since we can't know what happens next. And strictly speaking, if we go to the end with this, I can't actually participate; since I can't really understand what the other side even means with their slogans. Similar to the case of the "potato", if I want to live, I need to suspend my disbelief about total miscommunications to participate. - The same is true for economics. Economics, structurally, is made of scams. That is to say: every economic interaction is a mismatch of price and value. The reason for that is, that there is no objective value, only subjective, intentional valuations on either side, and the belief that the other has them too. For that reason only I might think something has a "low price"; because it's lower than how I would set it. I can only participate in the economy, when I presume that for the other, something has value; typically that is money; and then we transfer this "value" on other things. But really, there only are prices between us, not values, and no exchange can decieve us over that. Even if 1 Euro is 1 peice of bread, that doesn't mean either are valuable; or that I can know how much the other side values it. For a starving person, the bread has clearly more value than for the baker who needs to clear their stock. And it's this assymmetry, that creates the economy - supply and demand, surplus value, credit and interest etc; there is always an assymetry of objective prices and _objectified_ subjective values. - These are only a few examples, but they should suffice to explain the principle; that subjective systems, communicating via intentional meanings and ideas, actually produce social systems by the various ways they _can't_ directly interact with each other, and have to use other methods of symbolic communication.
8. What do we make of this theory of society? What does it produce on the side of the subject? There is in my estimate one clear effect: and that is a confusion of the subject of its own existence, or of the presence of the subjective system as such. This is, because either the communication works - and then seems to carry the meaning externally, in the communication, instead of the subjective system (that is the sociologizing view); or, it doesn't work, and it seems to be not communicable - that is, what is communicated appears as private; and is reduced to a mere intuition, not a consciousness of it (that is the psychologizing view). And it's this self-transparence of the subject that is the most peculiar phenomenon: its own distinction of itself from its environment reduces itself to a brute fact, or to this minimal point of self-understanding as self-alienation. This effect can be compared to an inner effect of self-consciousness; that the essence of the self-consciousness of the self is in a deeper way its own missing-itself. In this sense, one could argue that there is a level of truth in the transparancy of self-consciousness; if only, yes if, the subject would understand, that as its own inexistence it still _is_. And if it would not miss that the _elements_ of the self are also elements of this subjective system; and that this system is as more than as an inexistence. The inexistence is the attempt to reduce the system down to a "self" that acts, either as the subject of experience or of social action, but as the subjective system is more than one subject (even for singletts it's: self + subjective system infrastructure), it cannot be reduced that way, and therefore appears inexistent. This even appears in the naive way of writing down the "missing itself"; as it is _not_ a form of communication, not related to linguistic misunderstandings, but of consciousness, and its missing-itself is one of intentionality, of having and not having the same intentional content at the same time, of trying to think about, what it would be, to _not_ think about something, and therefore being forced to; of imagining being another, even internally being confronted to having been an other, but only by that to fall back to the fact, that I, as my person, as this self, can only be myself, not the other.
This only as a methodological introduction. It should make clearer, in what way I use terms like subjective as opposed to psychological, biological or social, as well as consciousness, the self, communication etc. None of what I've written is an _explanation_; it's, as stated at the beginning, a mere _exposition_ of a theory, not of the theory of that theory or of its justification. I may only hope that for the reader it is enough to suspend doubt for the rest of the text, and then, allthemore directly, confront its ambitions, and ask themselves, if they can agree with it, or if it reads as a statement too absurd to not be taken lightly; as a theoretical bird rather than a cathedral. Augur I shall then be more than cardinal, or ordinal alike.