It is one of the most usual, and, at the same time, most insidious action within any act of communication, to argue against or for a position not for the merits of its content, but by the virtue of certain definitions, that are used to describe within that context the terms in such a way as to ascertain all necessary consequences. These kinds of actions are neither rare nor surprising; they are, however, a sign that the _act of definition_ needs to be analyzed and understood to prevent the misuse of definitorial schemes and strategies to such end, and to understand how we can actually, correctly, define the categories of any form of social or political interaction, or which open field we have, of multiple possible ways of understanding the relationships between social reality and language, that is varyingly to be interpreted as use or misuse of the relevant categories of naming, or (mis)understanding, of the constitutive elements of society as based in our understanding of that, of what it is a society of.
I will argue here in full generality, but without any aspiration of comprehensiveness, or really any intention of historical bases. There are enough histories and handbooks of classical logic, and this is not one of them; I presume that logic, in its basic understanding, is either understood or at least understood where it can be (re)learned, and instead focus on the questions that lie beyond mathematical exactness, that describe different ways of "definition" beyond the fiction that in mathematical proof there is all knowledge as a form. Even Plato did not, in my understanding, think so; the mathematical proof was _one_ idea, an important one, but the general "mathematics" that he tried to reach is not the formal kind of game, that was devised last century, but more a way of actually reaching, through formal means, material truth. In this context I want, beyond the idea of definition as litterally stating what a word should be replaced with (the meaning within that mathematical, declaratory game), give other concepts of definition, that relate it to what could be called an "essence", but more closely resembles a certain core of meaning at the resemblence of situations of use. It gives us an opportunity to think about the act of definition as something that appears without tautology, that is, not introducing an unknown word, or merely referring to such an act, repeating its intention, but instead, with intention, now defining an old term (which is in fact what is most happening; most definitions are not for descriptions of new ideas, but for delineations of existing ones).
1. The first kind of definition I want here to reference is what I call "essential definition". This kind of definition takes the usages of a term, and tries to find a kind of meaning from which all other usages take their meaning. This means, we already know a word; we in fact already use it; but we now want to know what it "really" means. This is in fact what most dictionaries and encyclopedias do; they do not define new words - no one has to define what a "throne" or a "parfume" is for example, but someone might very well not know these words, for one reason or the other, and they might to look up a definition. These definitions are _not_ tautological, they are what I would call essential. That is: they try to condense the usage of a term, such that anywhere, where it is used, it refers to this "essence", or the "meaning" of the word. The idea here is not, that those usages would refer, for example, specifically refer to the Oxford dictionary; that would be quite absurd. Rather, any dictionary tries to capture, in its own way, a kind of essence hidden in the actual use of the word. It is still an open alternative if you believe these kinds of "meanings" exist seperate from their application or use; this marks the difference between descriptivism and prescriptivism, as prescriptivists need some kind of external "essence" to describe what a word should mean, whereas a descriptivist is quite fine in defining a word's meaning by its use (in this way one could say Wittgenstein, who said they were identical, was the most extreme descriptivist). Regardless however if this essence is thought to be accurately or inaccurately represented by the word's use, the idea is still, that there is a central "meaning"; something you can write in a few lines into the dictionary, describing all the ways a word is used. And the same is true if today in a wiki or forum post a word, that is in common use, is "defined" by a few phrases; this is not to define a new allophone, but to capture one of these meanings, an essence.
2. However, not always one can actually give such an essence, or a clear description of a term. More often, there are more complicated networks of resemblences, those famous Wittgensteinian familiar relationships of words like "game", where each usage resembles another one, and all are connected, but there is not necessarily a center. How can in these contexts a word be defined, if there is no clear essence? - Obviously, a direct and complete definition is here impossible. Rather than that, there are two more specific ways of at least limiting the meaning of a term:
a) Oppositional definition. Here we see, that none of the meanings of a word resemble a specific thing. For example: whatever "game" is actually defined as, war isn't a game. This is one possible "definition"; it demarks a word's usage. And one can often find such delimiting definitions, that are purely oppositional, without actually positing a positive meaning or essence. They can convey meaning, even if the meaning of the word is not fully known; and while for certain words, this definition might be tautological (like for the "non-book", which is clearly anything that's not a book), for most terms this is not true; "game" is not tautologically defined through "war", but that kind of definition does tell you something about the meaning of a word, similarly, but less rigorous, as a straight dictionary definition would. Often this is even more useful, and in learning a language it is much more common to find out difficulties with falsely assumed meaning than with unknown one's, for which reason in translation dictionaries this kind of definition should probably be more widely applied than it currently is.
b) Accidental definition. This is when we take two completely unrelated things, which accidentally share a certain property. Basically, whereas an essential definition tries to derive all objects from a certain essence, at least in principle, an accidental definition takes all the objects that we want to name something, and then finds out all the things they have in common. In the maximal case, this results in absurd definitions like: "X is defined as A or B or C or D ... except F or G or H or ...", basically just listing out its contents. This can be found, for example, for geographical definitions, like for "continent", "country" etc, where we have basically a list of fixed elements, and then try to find a definitorial criterion, to just catch these elements. By far the most common occurence however is in law, where lobbyists of all kind try to carefully draft "definitions", just appropriate to capture whom they want and noone else. These definitions are, this should be clear, much less useful than the other types of definition; we don't really learn what something is, but we also don't know what it's not. However, it is the only way of actually achieving a solid, legal definition, among other things, and should not be thought of as something unimportant, just as something not always appropriate.
3. And lastly, there is also the problem of vagueness, which is different from the issue of uncentered meanings or use of a word. A vague use is one that is undefined by sometimes a conscious decision. However: vagueness does not allow new types of definitions, it merely makes the application of definitions vague. That is, a vague term has multiple definitions which can be simultanously true. In a way, the true meaning of a vague term is given by a number of alternative definitions; we then have some cases, which fall under most definitions, other, which fall under no or few definitions, and then a vast area in between, which we can call the definitional fringe. A non-vague term will have no such fringe, but that is rare outside of pure math and theoretical physics. Especially for social and political categories (but even already for biological or cosmological ones), there will be exceptions that can't be correctly classified, such that there need to be multiple definitions. For example: we can have an essential definition with an exception; that exception is then, in itself, an oppositional definition, that supplants the essential definition, that in itself is not complete. (We could also theoretically count this all as one accidental definition; but that is only true if we actually refer, in our usage, to such categories. In some technical areas this may be true; but often, it is not, and the philosophy of science as well as political theory seems in my opinion to over-legalize language use by condensing these multitudes of definitions into one, legal-style accidental definition, when originally those definitions where not crafted together, but only empirically correlated, and used, at different times, to describe and define the term each, not to give a convoluted compound definition of a term.)
Now that we have a few examples of kinds of definitions, how do they refer to the concept of "identity", and how are these definitions actually used in social and political developments? Let us first look at these various kinds of definitions, and how they happen to be used in some paradigmatic examples; and then try to understand how these ways of defining identity can combine and interact, or fight each other.
1. There is certainly a practice of social definition, that belongs before all these more complicated, more vague and contradictory definitions, and that is the use of technical terms and exact definitions in the use of describing and talking about various groups of people. This is, as said, only really useful for terms not already in use; and therefore not really applicable at the very points where it would be most necessary. These definitions however do come into contact with the other, more useful and applicable styles of definitions, in that sometimes one refers to a technical definition of term X in sociology, without regard for the general use of the term; for in that discipline, it is a technical term, that is used in a particular sense, but the use of that term outside of that discipline demands a bit more than the mere assertion, that the definition is correct; for it already refers to an object, and can't therefore not simply borrow its technical definition. But if we were to invent a category - let's say for people with green eyes who stubbed their toe on a Friday morning - then we could give it a name, and this category could _later_ actually be used. In that case, this definition as a purely technically one would actually still be interesting; not because it would be relevant to describe the word use at any later point in time, but because it describes the reference point, to which all later developments must refer back, when they want to understand if this once technical definitions still holds water as an essential or accidental definition of the word it originally created, or if against it, new, then maybe also oppositional definitions, showing the flaws in the original wording, must be erected. (Maybe the original definition did not consider people who stubbed their toe at 10:00 am, as opposed to 9:00 am, and that would contrast with actual word use that would have developed at that time.) However, even in these cases, it must be clear that such terminological definitions are not really useful, because at best, they show a word to not really have an autonomous usage, more usually, they create a definition for a new term X' as a synonym for X, and at worst, they encourage active conflation of X with X'.
2. The more common kind of definition however is of words already in use, and of categories and identities, of which we do not even know who it could be that invented them, or of which, since their invention, the usage changed so much, that the original definitions are no longer important. The primary kind of definition then would be essential. And here we get, when we apply it to social contexts, not to matters like the essence of the word "table" or "cat", into much bigger differences. Because, as opposed to terminological definitions, the idea of an essential definition of a social term, and especially of a term of identity (be it essential, existential or external), must be related to, if not containing, a certain kind of self-identification with that essence, or with that specific element in this kind of "identifying" (as an act) that makes this act of identification distinct from other such acts. And there, two different attitudes can emerge: the various imperfections and unclarities about this act and its relation to the term so definied can be accepted as being of the term definied in this definition; i.e. as a vagueness, as having a fringe, as a necessity of another, overlapping definition; or, it can be seen as the imperfection of this act as such, that the act _should_ adhere to this essence - which nontheless is there and can be experienced, but just doesn't perfectly catches the experience of so identifying - so that the imperfection is not a theoretical imperfection of knowing the right kind of identifying, but a practical imperfection of performing it. This second attitude - that hypostates these kinds of categories to a value-theoretical usage - is what I call _essentialism_ in the most general sense. Essentialists do not merely pose that a certain essence _could_ capture a specific identity; rather, they presume this, and want to keep any imperfections of such essential definitons - any counter-example - at bay, by designating them as not really being under that term, _because_ it is not under that definition. The problem however ist, that this confuses the essential and the terminological use of definition: In the terminological sense, they would be correct to refuse any counter example to their definition; after all, the definitions defines the term, that's that, the term didn't exist before and doesn't exist outside of it, so anything not under it is simply that: not P. But if, for such a predicate P, an essential definition is searched, this predicate must already exist. It must already exist in such a confusing and prevalent use even, that searching for a new definition, that can clear up the mess of its usage, might seem tempting. Hence, when an essential definition is searched, all counter examples already exist, they cannot be swepped away. Essentialism is in this way a misunderstanding of essential definition; but it is such a natural one, that I wanted to include it under this heading, and want to use it to contrast true essential definitions and search for them (searches for an essence, that truly connects all members of a group, and no one else, and that is based on considering all extremes and exceptions), from this manner of essentialism, that, assured of the truth of its favoured definition, abandons all critical attitude in the approach of itself when considering that, what uncomfortably lies outside of its already delimited area of perfection and essential experience and apearances (or what might appear to them as such). The examples here are too numerous to have to go into strong detail; the searches for essences of identities like gender or nationality ("gender essence", "national spirit" etc.) are obvious and important examples, but this goes down even to the ridiculously fragmented level ("company spirit", "the naturell of the town" etc.); and in all of these cases the danger of essentialism is at play next to people who honestly want to understand, what the essence of their identity is.
3. However, what can we do if there does not seem to be a clear essence? Besides totally giving up ("you can simply identify as X" means nothing but "X does not have a definition, just a use"), there can be other kinds of delimitation, that can be applied even in the absence of such essences. Let us use the two examples from above: First, the oppositional definition. This is actually very widely used. For example, one very typical kind of definition of an audience for a certain social space might be: "Anyone can come here, or identify with us, but fascists are not allowed here." This defines a group politically by an oppositional definition: to not be fascist; which is very broad, but still defines an opposition, and says something about the group. Another group might say: "We allow anyone, but we don't talk about politics or sexuality here." This is another oppositional definition; it makes sense to define a group not just by what it does, but also by what it doesn't. In the same way now we can also approach identity: that it is a certain kind of experience, but not a specific one. For example, the broad spectrum of asexual and aromantic identities - or a-spec, as it is now called as a whole - is opposed to alloromantic-allosexuals; all of LGBT is in a sense opposed to cis-hetero people; and terms like "pagan" or "indigenous" describe any kind of religous and ethnic positions that a differing from the majority position of a country (for which reason for example Hinduism isn't called pagan, because it is a majority religion in India; the term is only really used for minority polytheistic beliefs, and is so broad, that it can only be really used oppositionally to monotheism; similarly to "indigenous" in late-stage settler societies, where the original inhabitants are, by the majority view, only defined as opposed to the majority, not by its own essence or nature). We can also find something analogous to essentialism here, and that is a false generalization of such an oppositional definition. In other words: a right counterexample is found, but then it is misunderstood as an essential definition (or even a terminological definition), that confuses one quality of that counterexample as an essence to which to be against. (For example, in a lot of the a-spec discourse certain particular elements of allo-specific situations are often wrongly understood as a quality against which a-spec is essentially or terminologically defined against, when really it is oppositionally defined agains allo people, as substance, or a real group, not as a quality that they also might accidentally have.) This specific mispractice, to differentiate it from essentialism, I will call _essentialization_. Essentialism and essentialization are very different thing, and one must understand that in order to commit essentialist misunderstandings, one must already have an essence, which, if impresent, can be created only by further misunderstandings of the kind that essentialization of oppositional definitions supplies. Whereas essentialism is the confusion of a common essence and a shared experience with a mathematical or dictionary definition, essentialization is the confusion of a counter-example or oppostion with a negation of a property or a negative predicate.
4. We have now to consider the effects of accidental definitions. Accidental definitions in relation to social or political entities are not as common as the other forms of definitions, and largely happen by a breakdown of otherwise existing systems of definitions. For example, if, at a certain point in time, multiple different groups create some sort of alliance based on a shared concept or idea, as an essence, or a shared enemy, as an opposition, and then this enemy falls away, or the essence is lost, this alliance can still persist, and can then create a kind of artificial essence, a kind of attribute of belonging to this group, that is defined beforehand so as to exactly include the members that were wanted in. This is most visible in political alliances, like the alliance system after the cold war, or in religous groups, where the shared element is more a kind of history of belonging to that group, rather than a true essence or something that can more concretely define it. On a personal level, friendship circles and families also function on that level, as well as clubs and unofficial groups, into which people are allowed in one by one, and they allow, if any, only accidental definitions, because the group was not formed in relation to any conceptual frame which it later could be defined by. We again have now here a kind of confusion; but it happens, that it is almost the same as in the last case. Again, we have a case of essentialization; at this point, the essentializing of a concrete group, accentially together and "definable" only in a very formal sense, into a postive idea, some kind of predicate. The same as what is done for negative predicates by essentialization of oppositional, is therfore happening for positive predicates by that of accidental definitions. Typical examples of that is trying to find the essence of a family, a club, a city, a nation, or a transnational alliance, when really all these constructs are more accidental than essential in nature, unless they actually were formed by a specific kind of essence, (or opposition), that has not run its course. There is also a new kind of problem, and that is what I would call antagonization: the confusion of an accidental with an oppositional scheme. This leads into a scheme, where an opposite to an accidental definition is arbitrarily constructed, and therefore creates an apparent oppositional definition, when really, this opposite was not the basis of definition for the original group, but in the opposite, this opposite was the construct opposite to it, and as such constructed, after it was already constituted. (This can include all kinds of personal grievances as well as national feuds and wars between global factions: they construct the other as the enemy, and imagine themselves defined by that opposition, when really, that opposition was defined by them. For example: the west is not constituted by fighting autocracy (as much as it might imagine it sometimes), but in the opposite, some autocracies are anti-Western. The examples of these kinds of confusions, often deliberate, are boundless.)
5. The impact of vagueness on the act of political definition now relates to these kinds of confusions - essentialism, essentialization and antagonization - that lie in the copresence of these forces. We can therefore create a rank order of britalness of definitions: the accidental definitons are the most brital, they can decay through antagonization, essentialization and essentialism, one after the other; then come, in order, the oppositional, the essential and the terminological definition. On the other side, there are opposite processes, that create examples that are then confused with the abstract element they are examples of. Those are not the most politically noticable, but definitely possible - the insinuation, that what was created to oppose a certain group, and exclude it, was only an accidental coalition, and pointing it out would be a false kind of antagonization for example (this is one possible conceptualization of racism, although I am not quite sure if it actually is correct, since most kinds of exclusion are rather explicit, and therfore would actually create oppositional definitions outright; but for some people this fake sense of accidentality might actually exist). Now the real question is then: how can these confustions and sometimes deliberate misunderstandings be differentiated from the natural vagueness, the definitional fringe, present in all non-mathematical forms of definition and formation of words?
This question is very difficult to pose, because it requires judgement, not mere willingness to define something. It shows the non-triviality of the act of social definition, as not just the content, but also the method of definition, might be confused both by the definor, definiens and definiendum (to misuse the classical latin terms, and add to it; so the definer, as in the subject that does define, the thing that defines, as in the meaning used to define it, and the thing that is to be defined, so in this case a particular kind of identifying and being), and thus create many more ways of misdefining ideas. This can now, in general, not be truly decided, as it is to broad; which is why I need to think about more generally how these terms can be applied to the plural phenomenology; and which kinds of essentialisms, essentializations and antagonizations are typically for the (self-/selves-)description of the consciousness and the experience of life of plural, dissociative and general multiple subjectivity and embodiedness.