In the following I will not try to give an overview, in general, of all possible experiences of multiplicity, plurality or dissociation; not just because that would be, in a short essay, impossible, but also because I do not know them and will not be able to experience even most of those which I do know. Instead, I only wish to give a few distinctions that I know of, to describe the various categories of plurality and dissociation and related phenomena typically described, and to have a kind of understanding, of how they relate to each other. Because I think, that ultimately, those terms and the corresponding identity terms, are not as difficult to understand as it appears, if we at first releave ourselves from the necessity of strict definition, and to describe at first the phenomena that appear in even the briefest of overviews of the topic. Because of the preliminary character of this section, it also embodies the shortcomings of its author; and I admit, that insofar as I skipped certain distinctions, it is more likely due to my ignorance than due to some active decision. The active decision more lies in the brevity with which each distinction is treated, and by which such questions as their origin, meaning and social extent will be set aside completely for this first examination of the topic. Let us begin with a systematic consideration that can elucidate those distinctions at a first level:
"To identify" is not quite a simple thing. The identity (from Latin idem, the same [via french use of scholastical language]) is originally a theoretical term, describing the "sameness" of a thing or predicate. This, its oldest usage, is still present in mathematics: we speak of "Euler's identity", and don't mean the man, but the equation. And one can say that even when speaking of people, there is this way in which it is used as a method of external "identification", of noticing two things being the same, identifying them. In this way, we can say that someone "is of the identity of the perpetrator", in that he is identical to a murderer being searched, for example. In this context, "identity" is something between two things: the person before me, and the one being searched; the person being "of the identity" means nothing but "being in the relation of being identical to ...", i.e. as a comparison. This usage of the word than leads to a subtle change in "identifying"; instead of meaning "setting two things to be the same; equating them" it comes to mean "recognizing something or someone". In this way, we say that we can "identify" one book from a bookshelf; not that we set the book to be identical to something else, but that we recognize this book, _as being identical_ to the one being searched. This might seem exactly identical to the previous use case of the word, but it is not. In the previous case, we searched for someone, and after finding them, and recognizing who he was, we said that he was "of the identity". In other words, identification here is the mental process of equating things, after already having recognized what they are. However, in case of the book, we say that we "identify" the book, when really we mean that we recognized it. The "identity" of the book is still the same as the "identity" of the perpetrator - a kind of equality - but the act of "identification" has changed. This form of use, of "identifying" as "finding"/"recognizing", is also very often used for people; for example, we say that we "identify" someone on the street as our friend; then we mean that we recognized, noticed them. This use of the word does not refer to a concious process of "identifying" who that person actually is; it is merely this act of recognition. And from this, the word "identity" gets its main meaning: who someone is, or rather, what is necessary for someone to recognize them. However, here we get two very different interpretations, as well as a third, opposing position, referring to the original, mathematical or essential definition of identity:
1. A position of "identity" taken from a subjective stand point of recognition. I recognize myself - as me. My identity is me. And similar, I can say, that I recognize the other as "the other", as whoever it is. This form (sometimes simply called self-identity, or self-identification, "being me" etc.) therefore ultimately makes "identity" mean the same as "individual person"; it does not so much signify a specific quality, as the fact, that this individual person exists, their irreplacability or mere presence. Any quality is here a mere approximation of the actual "identification" of the person by their presence, through simply being here.
2. One can however also take the outside, the societal perspective. In this position, my "identity" is what makes me recognizable to others, it's my properties and presentation externally visible, my "profile" (in an increasingly litteral sense). This identity is then comprised of identifying qualities; only on this background I can say, that it is my identity to be trans, plural, white, pagan etc; not because I "identify" with them (for some of them I wouldn't even recognize without interaction with other people), but because others _identify someone to be me_ by them. Identity here is closer to "personal data", and it is in this sense that identity is understood in the "identity card", or in the newer conception of the "online identity" etc., which takes its clues more from passports than from subjectivist philosophy.
3. However, there is a third way to interpret "identity". This is referring back to the mathematical notion of identity; here my "identity" is not just me, or some qualities, but all qualities that make me me, i.e. not just what makes me recognizable, or knowable to myself, but what is my essence, what defines me. "identity" as essence is its mathematical understanding, as it here litterally poses: find me something I'm identical to! but doesn't accept "me" as a simple answer. In this way then, identity becomes a search; not satisfied with the facticity of life, or of external descriptions, I then search for what "makes me me", for my inner essence etc. And ultimately, I may find that there is no such thing, that it was a fruitless search, that nothing specifically in my life "makes me me" but simply existing; but even that can then be hypostasized as some great discovery. The cheapest production from the history of "existentialist" literature are legion on this topic, and popular culture is also not wanting for descriptions of searching for the "true self".
The first usage of the word is certainly rare. One might say "I don't know the identity of the person", but might still refer to the second usage, or to the comparative/relative usage, described before. In any way, it is at least possible, and so I thought it interesting to at least list the three occuring phenomena here, that are all, in differeng ways, called "a person's identity". To disambugate, I shall refer to them furtheron in different terms, namely as personhood or who-I-am, as the external identity or assignment, and as the what-I-am or the essence or self, respectively. All of these terms are, by themselves, systematically ambiguous in the same way, but I hope that I will in the forthcoming deliberations be clear enough in my distinctions, and will also leave enough contextual epitaphs as not to have unclarity over my respective choice of vocabulary.
It is from this distinction that we can now come, in a more systematic way, to a description of various ways of what is called dissociation. By the typical definition, it is a disturbance either in the sense of self (depersonalization), or in the reality of the world (derealization), or of the identity of the self (dissociative identity). Just focussing on this third element (we will come back to the other two later), we see that the maning of this phrase, of the "identity", is quite different, when it is taken in the meanings presented here. And while the second meaning - that of external identification - is rarely used, as it would describe not something internal, but an external descriptor, of something happening to someone (in this sense someone might be "dissociative" if they are recognized by some people as a man and by others as a women (independent of their internal sense of identity); which is conceptually interesting, but practically not really what is undestood as "dissociativity" - as this term is supposed to carry a psychological, or at least not a pure sociological explanation - although I am not opposed for this "external dissociativity/dissociation" to be recognized, I merely have not seen any actual examples or relevant descriptions under it), the other two are often used, and give two distinct notions of dissociativity, tied to the respective notion of identity:
1. On the one side, if identity is here taken to be the Who-I-am, my personhood, than a possible "disturbance of identity" is a kind of unclarity of who I am. I might simply be confused: what actually is my name? Am I really this person, or not someone else entirely? And therefore the dissociation is between/about this "who", i.e. not about any _contents_ of the self, but about its _presence_, its personhood as such. I call this the _existential dissociation_.
2. On the other side, with identity taken as the What-I-am, my essence, the "disturbance" is about what it really means for me to be me. I can be very sure, that I'm myself, and not anyone else, but that doesn't guarantee that I know what that means. I can still be unsure, who this person, that I am, really, truly is. Am I not confused about it? Have I been mistaken about _what kind of person_ I truly am? And questions of that kind. The dissociation is here between/about the various _contents of the self_, not the presence or reality of the self, which, if it is a pure form of this kind of dissociation, is not even touched; I am still fully myself, and there is also no disturbance in the "sense of self" (i.e. the evindenciary quality of the self, as it will be described later); what is questionable is, whether or not these experiences that I have, are truly mine, and would truly define me, or if rather the truth of myself is hidden, and my "identity", my idea of how I define myelf, wrong and manipulated. I call this the _essential dissociation_.
(In a plural context, the difference between these two can most adequately be expressed by the difference between the questions: who is currently fronting? and am I confusing my personality with another alter's / their influence, or with something outside the system interveining (like a dream, or a conscious construction mistaken for memory) ? - although it is important to note, that the singlett case is probably more common, but itself easier to express, by nature of these questions, in plural vocabulary, even if only one (complete) alter is present)
It is important that dissociation here is also a systematically ambiguous term. And I think this leads us to another distinction:
I believe Obscura was right to point out in her talk [at PPWC 2023], that the term "dissociation" refers to a phenomenon, when things are originally "associated", and then become "dissociated", or in other words, that first there is a sense of "identity", and then various elements, as moments (in the Hegelian sense) become apparent and distinguishable on that identity, and become independent from each other, but are nonetheless of the same fundamental identity. "Existantial dissociation" for example means being confused who I am, but thinking that those various "who" are still fundamentally connected. This is especially true for "essential dissociation": ultimately, this dissociation is the direct correlate of what we could call "essential association", which connects, within the "identity" of the self, all elements of thoughts together; "essential dissociation" is the shadow of that rationality, which Hegel called "Spirit", that is "reason, in the consciousness, to be all of reality". In a similar way, the dissociation moves through all of reality, all what I could be; or all of my possible personal identites, all who-I-am. But it is still dissociation to an association; it is connected through these terms. Therefore, through the connection of these structures, a form of existence in this way should be rightfully called _dissociative_, not _plural_ systemhood.
As opposed to this, there is plurality. Now how do we understand this? It is actually quite simple. _Plurality_ in any dimension, in which dissociation exists, replaces the _disturbance_ of a singular term/entity with the existence of multiple, independent elements, that after the fact come into contact. Or, in another word, the _association_ here described, and therefore the structure of identification, is that of communication with the other alter, as constituted to be different, and not merely a modification of the self. _plurality_ as a subjective phenomenon is thus present not as a disturbance of a unity, but as another unity, approaching the other. In other words: we get two different modes:
1. That of "existential plurality". This is the mere fact that there are multiple persons, presences, who-I-am's - but each of them potentially knows exactly who they are, in which case there is no dissociation
2. Similarly, "essential plurality" is simply a copresence of multiple "essences" or "selves" within the self, without necessarily being confused about it. I might simply have two different, conflicting definitions, that somehow turn out to be the same (cf. the "cryptomorphic" definition of "matroid" in combinatorics for an example, of how this can be a very logical and not at all internally dissociated thing; there really can just be two essences)
It turns out, that the difference existential/external/essential, of the meaning of "identity", is orthogonal to the distinction between "dissociativity" (as the seperation of one identity) and "plurality" (as the unification of at least two distinct identities in communication). Also, notably, we are talking here about the distinctness of _phenomena_, not about the difference of those who experience them. The same person can experience all six of these at the same time (a rather extreme experience, but not logically impossible); however, within that experience, all these moments are distinct from each other. There are, by this description, then at least four groups: dissociative-non-plurals, plural-non-dissociatives, plural-and-dissociative, neither-plural-nor-dissociative; and I will distinguish here those who groups, those who are neither plural nor dissociated - the singletts - and all others, which will in this terminology be called _multiple systems_, or _systems_ for short (although this term will shortly be used for a type of system that is _not_ multiple also, so we have to be careful with this terminology).
Also, it is very clear that "plurality" in this sense is neither connected not opposed to the other two forms of dissociation (derealization and depersonalization), which I therfore will name _non-systematic dissociation_. (These are generally also what is meant by the _act of dissociating_, and closer connected to evidence than to material experience - a question which will be revisited when reviewing the connection of these various types of "identity" to their general form of "realization".)
There is a third modality of identity, that I now, more speculatively than empirically, want to introduce, and that is that of _intellectual systematicity_, or of what one could call _internal_, or _conceptual_ plurality or dissocaition. The difference here is, that were a dissociation or plurality has either a unity, set apart into parts, or several unities, forming together a system of communication, both of these have the separation of unity and difference within them. An _intellectual system_ would then be not really a seperation of unities or parts, but a recognition of a single unity as being of multiple parts, or of a multitude of unities as being parts of a system; in other words, this form of intellectual systematicity - which can be extended, like the other two, to either existential, external or essential identities - does not so much mark a separate, new state, not understood by the other two terms, but precisely the coincidence of them; one could call it therefore also a dissociated plurality or a plural dissociation. Together with nondissociative singlettness (as the absence of both) this term completes the picture of the orthogonal axes of dissociation and plurality in relation to any relevant category of identity. (Intellectuality is a new term, that I introduce here in direct relation to the various "philosophical systems" of intellectual history. It is not meant as a qualitication of the person(s), but rather as a modality of communication - of something being "real", more than dissociation, but less than "plural", in the sense of always returning-home, always being part of one "intellect", as its various self conceptions or forms of consciousness, as Hegel once thought of all reality. It was, in a sense, what we once thought to be, before I realized aspects of my experience lying beyond it in the realm of the plural alone, of the us, and some parts/dimensions of my consciousness merely being dissociated and unclear; but it is for that personal history, that I will take all the more care for it to be separated from the other two, and understood as something important, although not practically important today, to the general study of the phenomena of plurality and dissociation as such.)
Beyond those various kinds of experiences of identity - which we cannot go into here further, because of the complexities of the topic and the fact, that this essay is ultimately not directed towards descriptions of particular aspects of subjectivity, but of those subjects themselves, as to who they are and to how they experience and describe themselves and their existence - the question of their history, or of the _genesis of identity_ is one often put, and a dimension of description we at least need to give a broad terminology towards. This is again here only a phenomenological overview; none of these hypotheses are given factual importance; all may be correct or neither; but instead, they describe, at least to some extent, the realm of our imagination when we talk about the "origin of identity" (or non-identity) in this context.
1. The first and most natural theory of genesis is, that there does not need to be one at all. In this view, the form of identity - be it plural, dissociated, intellectual-systematic, singlett or other - is simply the form of the mind or of consciousness; there is no need to find a genesis for it, for genesis, history and time itself is one of its modification. This basic absence of genesis I call the theory of _natural identity or systematicity_. It often is combined with a categorization of the "minds" into their properties, that they are supposed to have naturally/essentially, if not in all eternity (although both of these elements - the presumption of a kind of hidden "essence" or "nature" as a formal cause, and its immutability, are not logically necessary to this position, they are nontheless both often present features of variations on those beliefs).
2. However, this might not be satisfying, might not be enough. Maybe, in a sense, the origin of identity/non-identity seems strange or unnatural enough, that there needs to be some account of its history, be it as explanation, justification or mere contemplation of the complex of the present with the past, of their necessary interconnections and differences. And for that, there is a huge number of various names present, describing different kinds of origins, mostly different kinds of causes. One only needs to look at the list on pluralpedia (https://pluralpedia.org/w/Category:Origin_Terms) to see the number of terms, just for systems who identify themselves under the category of plurality; and even though a lot of these might be different labels for what is broadly the same experience, there are a few general kinds we can find here, which are clearly seperated types of origin:
a) There is the category of systems which have outside causes relating to their origin, these don't have a common term - usually people refer to more specific elements of how they came to be - but I will, because the opposite, those with internal causes, are called "endogenic", call them exogenic in this essay. Exogenic is a very broad term, including at least the following subvariants:
i) The most common variant is clearly that which is generally called "traumagenic"; this includes all form of external origins, where the external cause is a traumatic event or experience, that cause the system to exist (and without which the system would not be). Importantly, this is, as an origin term, _completely orthogonal to the distinction of plurality and dissociation_, at least on this conceptual / phenomenological level. Obviously, traumagenesis is a complicated topic, and I am not read enough to have confidence giving an overview here, I merely want to position it at a fitting place within this conceptual scheme of various terms of system origins.
ii) Those which arose at birth by an external, non-traumatic force; this might be one interpretation of "natural multiplicity", as interpreted by an influence, maybe genetic or environmental, at birth or close to that time
iii) Later, one could count a kind of parenting or education, that would bring about multiplicity, to be an external force. Similarly, all sorts of mentors, gurus etc. Tupamancers who use a tutorial / handbook, or who study with a master, could count towards this, and even more the actual Tibetan practice of Stulpa, and similar practices in other cultures, where thoughtforms or other alters are created under the instruction of a teacher, who's teaching can here be understood to be an "external cause" for their creation.
iv) Lastly, pure chance can be similarly involved. It might be, by a random, though non traumatic event, that I see, that I am an alter. I must not even be certain what it is; but it could be happening by a certain inspiration, by which systematicity is then created.
b) On the other side, there are internal causes for the mind to realize states of multiplicity, and those are generally grouped under the term endogenic. At least the following would be usually included under them:
i) Protogenic systems, or systems always being multiple, are categorized under endogenic, and I think this does make sense, when we interpret "natural multiplicity" in such a way, that there does not need to be an external cause, outside of the existence of the mind, maybe not even strictly in the body (as multiplicity is a property of the subjective, phenomenological mind, and categorically distinct from its behavioral representations, which do necessarily, as bodily actions, have a cause connection to the body; the mind as such does not necessarily, and therefore we can posit here an entirely internal cause, even against bodily factors, for the internal constitution of a multiple subject, plural or dissociative).
ii) Self-created systems also fall under this category. This would include unsupervised, or non-exogenic tulpamancy, fictogenic systems, which are created from internal imagination etc. The separation to exogenesis becomes here a bit difficult to specify, but I do think that thoughtforms can be both external and purely internal. A form of temporary systematicity of this endogenic kind would be imaginary friends, which are not usally not formed under supervision or a plan, but are creations from within a mind, typically a young one, which creates these forms internally.
iii) Creation by chance or circumstance can also be internal. This can happen for example by a random thought, which might totally throw the systems structure. Given the differences between various systems, those cannot be described here in great detail, but there are enough stories of headmates just "showing up" after some idea of another.
iv) And finally, I would say there even is something like a "trauma-endogenesis". The easiest example here would be a fight between two headmates, so that one headmate would split into a subsystem. However, I don't think that this would actually hold as a descriptive term for the whole system, rather, in this case, it actually would presume that the system on some level existed, and only the splitting occurs this way; however, this might explain the possible splitting of fused systems. One can at least theoretically imagine, that a singlett could split, in a similar way, into a system; now, it is possible to assume, that the cracks, so to speak, of the singlett (in the case of dissociativity), or the hidden others (in case of plurality) were there beforehand, and simply only showed up at a point of self inflicted, or inner-self harm and trauma; but that is a hypothesis of identification of terms, which is not accessible at this point of argumentation, where we only ought to, phenomenologically, describe the extents of our _imagination_ of possible forms of multiplicity; and since this form of trauma-endogensis is something I can imagine, as much as I don't know if it actually exists or if anyone claims this origin, it is, for systematic completeness, useful to include it in this table.
We can see that there is a complete symmetry between the two lists (i - iv, ii - i, iii - ii, iv - iii respectively), so that we can say, that the _direction_ of origin is seperate from the _referent_ of origin; in that a system origin refers to an object (or the absence of an object) in some way, and then describes the relation of the creation of the system, if that thing is the cause of multiplicity, or if the multiplicity is itself caused by itself, actively referring to that thing (i.e. differing in if the relation is the category of praxis or pathos).
c) Missing on the list as of now are adaptive-origin systems. As far as we understand, adaptivity is the creation of a system in the adaption of external circumstances, i.e. it would be a combination of exogenic and endogenic, in that an external source would be present, but would only indirectly cause the systematicity through in an internally acting process of "adaption". I don't know enough about this topic to explain this further, but I think it can clearly be understood, in some sense, in the terminological schema here provided
e) Also missing are spontaneously created systems, as opposed to that have no cause (spontaneous origin), or no known cause (unknown origin), as well as mixed-origin system, with more than one cause. These can however also fit in this terminology as an expansion of the possible experience, and are of the same kind as the other terms. (Note: The unknown-cause case is included in this clause to seperate systems with no (known) cause from those, which have a cause with unclear knowledge. Spontanously created or arisen systems both are closer to "mixed" origins, as any acts of mixing as a zero-position, than the unknown-as-in-unknowledge system case, which is relating this whole question to not just a kind of mixing, or of the presence of evidence, but also of the kind and extent of evidence present)
f) Those who have no known cause are also different in a sense of the modification of the previous terms: they are on a spectrum of known to unknown origin, or modified by their strength or clarity of evidence (to others and the self). However, since all understanding is marked with certain modicums of knowledge and evidence, and things like spontaneous events and trauma especially, this is no marked change in the terms, just a further expansion along a new dimension of categorization.
3. However, the one type which is in itself different from the other terms are system not precisely of unknown origin, but of which the origin is unimportant. This category - quoigenic systems - modifies all previous terms to also be terms of _importance_ or _emphasis_. That is, to the declaration or search of origin belongs a kind of speech act, that declares it to exist, beyond the knowledge of something having happend or being the case; and this brings us back to point 1. Why is there a need for an explanation or origin? Maybe there isn't. But maybe there also _theoretically_ is, but it can be ignored, or is an unimportant need. This is precisely the difference of quoigenic from purely natural systems, that they go through the question of origin, and, after thinking about it, dismiss it as irrelevant, rather than simply not having asked it (as certain systems outside of a tradition of such questions might do).
Another question which is often discussed in the context of terminology, and which confuses, at least to some extent, this discussion, is the way in which it relates identity to expression, and specifically both to degree and severity of separation or unity. Those two concepts however are quite distinct, hence they should be explained seperately.
The question of "degree" relates to questions like those of separation or distinctness, as well as to the kind of separation or distinctness, be it of communication, memory, bodily functions and sensations, cosciousness etc. This is quite a complicated topic, which does require a more complicated analysis than we can here provide. However, there are two examples of such kinds of degrees that are already used, and should be explained as to their way of seperation/relation.
The first is what is generally called "medianness", median systems, the midcontinuum etc. The separation described with medianness is itself one of identity. It could relate, depending on its actual use, to any of the identity categories described above. So there could be plural systems that are median - i.e. systems with distinct, later associated identities, who happen to already to be alterations of the same kind of person - or dissociative systems who might be median - i.e. systems with an original core that is somewhat dissociated into parts, but still mostly keeps together, and which has a kind of varying map-structure, like a topological manifold, which is similar on each point, has a local topology, but also a kind of extension between them, that still connects them. Also, it is important to differentiate mediannes with essential plurality or dissociation; while plurality or dissociation might be more naturally associated with their existential kinds, the essential kinds are as high in "degree", just about a very different question of identity. In this sense, one can easily also be a "median essential-plural system", i.e. a system of various "essences", or ways-to-be, that come together to form a person (i.e. a person with many selves or self-conceptions), which however are not just happening to be of one person (like any essential plurality as opposed to existential plurality), but also happen to be the same beforehand, happen to be essences of a similar kind. - It is also clear that the midcontinuum is probably as vast and undiscovored as plurality and dissociation each. Nontheless, simply from the way the word is being used, it might make sense to keep it as a general term, and to describe variations under it as variations of plurality/dissociation under medianness, rather than as different kinds of medianness itself, because, by its generality and structural grammar, it seems more capable of a categorical (in the Aristotelian sense) than of a special (as in species) use (i.e. different kinds of medianness aren't subspecies of medianness, but of multiplicity in general, and exhibit, by a specified degree of seperation, a property / categorical descriptor of medianness, but aren't "essentially" median, in the same way as no object is essentially up or down, because medianness describes, above anything, a relation to a different kind of multiplicity, or to its own inner potential to be and its horizon of essential modifications ("Wesensabwandlungen" as Husserl might have written) of identity).
The second kind of "degree" I want to talk about is the degree placed on the evidential quality of experience itself, or specifically, to the way in which experience seems "real" or not. This is, in our view, also one of seperation in the described sense, however, not one of identity. This is because identity is not really a form of evidence or experience to begin with, but based on an identifiying act, or a description of similarity/difference, as described earlier, be it existential, essential or external. This way of an irreality of experience however is closely related to the degree of identity; since it is a simple movement from "degree of unclarity of knowing who/what I am" to "degree of unclarity of the knowledge of who/what I am"; because the first comprises identity, in the knowledge of who I am, the second reflects on the act of that knowledge as experience. it is however very well possible to have no uncertainty, that I really know who I am, and still finding this knowledge "unreal". The similarity between the two has lead to the term "dissociation" being used for both of them, which is quite a shame, since it confuses this whole description, as the two questions are really distinct; derealization and dissociative or plural identities are not the same, but the phenomena of reality and of distinctness of identity and of their experiences are however still related. I think that in this context we can group three phenomena that seem related to this: a) derealization, as in a kind of unreality of the phenomenon of the world as such (one could say, in reference to Husserl, a kind of unwanted epoche of the general thesis of reality); b) depersonalization, as in a kind of unreality of the phenomenon of the self and thoughts, or of my identity, as experienced by myself; c) body dysmorphia, as a kind of unreality of my body really being mine, but not as question of a worldy phenomenon ("Körper"), but as the body of experience ("Leib"), or of their mismatch (as I am not knowledgable enough, to distinguish, if the word in its current psychological use refers to the unclarity of the Körper-Leib connection, or to that of the Leib, the primordial body as experience, itself, I leave it to those who do to decide, as we then would have to find a different name for the other category; in any way, we do think that both fit under the category of reality/unreality of experience, and therefore dysmorphia is, in the broadest sense of the term, a kind of "dissociation"). - There may be more than these three, but they are already being described, and fit the classical description of experience, as being structured by external sense data / sensitivity, of the internal rationality or desire, and of their connection in judgement and bodily experience, quite nicely.
Another, somewhat related object, is that of the "act of dissociating". This often referrs to someone's change in attention, among other things. I just wanted to mention it at this place to show both the breadth of the usage of that word as well as its ununitedness under a common categorical form. To "dissociate" in this way can refer namely not just to the evidence ("reality") of an experience, but also to its content, or to the unity of the object (an object as a unification of its attributes, experiences etc.), which consequently is broken apart. From what we understand, this act is related to the general modality of dissociation in derealization, but still distinct, and would deserve its own distinguished exposition by a more qualified narrator; hence we will at first omitt such, but hope, in its place, to leave this note as a reminder of the necessity to relate to more distinct _expressions_ of both degree of experience and identiy and their phenomenal qualities also.
The second term we wanted to explain is that of severity of separation or unity. This term almost sounds the same as degree, but is really distinct to it, and that is because it ascribes to a quantity (distance/unity) a qualitative difference ("severe" distances). This term is quite misleading in this way, and it is one often misused instead of degree, although it means something different. Severity is, as I see it, more a question of the quality ascribed to plurality/dissociation, or their median forms, as such. And I would say, that "severity" in this sense maps onto a different distinction, namely on that of disordered/non-disordered, which however categorically cannot be part of this phenomenological overview, as it is a political or at least social term, and not a (mostly) subjective one as the others used thus far. In itself however, severity is a subjective question: it is the question of the experiencial quality of the reality of being plural, for example. How do I experience that? Do I rejoice at the idea, or am I depressed, or do I take it as a matter of fact? Severity obviously has the connotation of pain - and hence, it is often understood to be a simple binary distinction of disorderd/non-disordered - but really, there are lots of different subjective attitudes possible towards it, and I think it is necessary to acknoweldge all of them to get an idea of these subjective elements, that are, as one could say, modifications or modes not of the experienced, but of the experience itself, and of the way or relation to the experience thus discovered. Given that breath of it, I shall leave it at here, both for this particular description of quality and of the phenomenological overview in general.
What have we learned? We have seen that the term identity can be understood existentially, externally and essentially, that we have thus different dissociations of identity, and different modes of plurality, and of their coincidence (intellectual systematicity); that we can describe various ways of relating to the question of origin - either impresent, or anwered as exo- or endogenic or adaptive or mixed or unknown, or as rejecting the question, as quoigenic - and that we can understand all experiences described by that kind of identity in relation to the experiences marking its content, in the kinds of degrees, be it within the experienced identity as medianness, or of the reality of the identity as its "reality", or in the act of experience, and its various modalities of "severity" or of subjective constitution and its sideeffects. In all of this, we saw the variety of these phenomena, and it is now obvious, that at this side, the highest degree of care needs to be applied, if clear definitions or understandings, of oneself/ves or others, are to be made of what appears now before us as a treasure, or an undiscovered mountain, of experience, that yet lacks the necessary roads for us to travel, from the lowest discovered point, to anywhere near an overview. Therefore, the question becomes necessary: what is, in the context of this experience, the act of definition? And in what way is this act of definition itself connected to the act of identification?
Note: There are some additions I wanted to make to this older text, which I ultimately refrained from doing, since they do not fit very well into its structure, however, two omissions I must mention: 1. That of non-consistent or non-closed systems, be it gateway systems, or psychotic plurals/multiples who may not even understand themselves to be "systems" due to not having one closed nature/substaniality, and being more of an abstract collective, closer to the Cantorian absolute infinities; 2. The process of blending, described in great detaill by Harmonic System in their talk at PPWC 2024, which adds a new dimension to the complex process of plural identification, which needs to be added into the description given here, and more closely connected to various aspects, which might also lead to a better general conception of processes such as switching.