

particular universalism. a meditation about the idea of systematic thought. (16/17.05.2023 by Hypatia of Sva)
(this is a new essay, translated as to not be connected to my deadname)

Against the idea of the philosophical system, there are multiple stereotypes often brought to bear, in lieu of the historical use of the word: that it would be absurd, arrogant, or even pointless, to plan out and execute a systematic train of thought, and that such would only be possible from a ruling point of view, a generic position, that thinks already itself to be everything. From my point of view, this does not seem to be the case, especially, since systematicity for me is not a kind of aspiration out of arrogance or desire, but always has been the solution out of necessity, an embarrassing after-thought last-ditch solution of a mind trying to find but the unity of a single thought. However, I in no way want to refute the accusations as made against their original targets; the faults of the philosophical systems of the 18th and 19th centuries are well known to me, and they're examples to me more in the call to be cautious in how small one can achieve in sight of a good aspiration of mind. In the opposite, I want, in the name of this idea aspiration and its real possibility, to create a position, in which this goal can still stand fully justified, but without the criticized fault, to be complicit with power, and impossible outside of the indefinite outlook of the view from nowhere and none.

To write *a system from a particular point of view*, assumes at first already, that this perspective is in some way already systematic, that it has the capacity, to be, already for itself, everything. "being everything" must be a quality of it, even if only as a particular subdescription. Because I can't and don't want to write out a full system of thought in this mediation, I want to first say in which way this system must then be specifically particular, and how far it still can be, not in spite but precisely because of its particularity and specificity of its perspective, universal and systematic.

Description of the limitations stemming of particularity.

1. The most immediate limitation is of the person. This at least twofold: first as to the body; and secondly as to the person mediated by the body (of which there can be multiple associated to the same brain, and in the same way each of them multiple Ideas of the self, and in those each mediated multiple images of various kinds/copies of the moments of the I, from essence and understanding over desire to the form of thinking itself). This limitation is one stemming from desire: I may want this or that now, but this how-I-want[-it], i.e. the form of eros in noesis, has this central role that constitutes personhood, even in perception (as that what is unchangeable, being pain etc.). This particularity is immediately graspable in any conversation; I don't know, *how* the other wants, what it could mean to them, to feel pain or desire. This is what I call, in analogy to the presence of these contents in the immediate connection of experience, the immediate disconnection of the living [beings] between each other.
2. The next closest limitation is that of the content, which this desiring and experiencing is referring to. I only experience, what I experience, nothing else, even if I could experience it (This is why this is no limitation of the general proposition, that, what I can't experience, I can't describe with any clear terminology; because it is the previously described boundary of the how-I-want, of how-I-experience, [or the wanting and experiencing as opposed to specific wants and experiences], that lets something not fall under the form, in which it [exists] distinctly / can appear specifically [as what it is]; but here it's so, that a second limitation applies, that some part of this, even if it, when looked at, appears as thinkable and experienceable, will never have been experienced and that everything can't be experienced, because it is, in itself self-referencing and even self-inclusive, absolutely infinite). This limitation is also shared, strictly only between persons of the same body (as a union of memories), in a wider meaning also between people of similar background and

position and experience. In any way, it is the material [of thought/experience/life], which describes this difference, of which one has, willingly or unwillingly (if by outside limitations [like force or annoyance or advice] or by not-understanding), had to make an experience/note of.

3. Beyond this material however there is, even within a single person-concept of the how [= a self-conception of an alter, of how they think they experience the world], and of the same What, still a differentiated accidental How, or a change of the formal colouring. Simpler said: I am not just determined by myself and what I experience, but also by the way, in which I experience it in the situation, and therefore can't claim to have experienced something, which I don't care about, as if I would, or even just to know what that would have been like [in this instance specifically, situationally].

4. Also the horizon of reference, or the boundary of possible intentionalities, is limited through the limitation of the material; however, this is strictly speaking a different limitation than that of material itself [= point 2] (for example, as the horizon of historical knowledge, as opposed to lived history; or other differences of knowledges and kinds of being-able-to-reference, and of one's own life).

5. Lastly, also the medium of self-mediation, or of methods or reflection, is limited thus, in [a way in] which, independent of matter, form, kind of experience and the horizon of its references, [also] the way to refer back to it is limited by the given [/learnt] horizon of possible ways of thinking-myself or also of not-knowing-myself (which, as far as I can see it, is more or less the same, if the Self, which is the object to understand, is precisely its way of retreating itself away from me [= Entzug, self-dissolvance, i.e. a way of something becoming less apparent the more I think about it]).

How can now, limited this way, a system still be possible? Rather than deducing down an answer, that should give us some kind of reassurance of success (which is probably only possibly once it's done, and only as an empty reflection and not as a pre-work or an actual reflection - even the Kantian question, how science is possible, always had this strange tilt, to presuppose it [the science, specifically geometry, arithmetics and Newtonian mechanics] as a given fact, and not to actually recreate them as something, in a way one could have discovered it), I want to only give a way towards it, so a method [per the greek meaning of "he methodos"], which can clearly also fail. I just think that failure is also an element and a [kind of] goal, and that we miss the whole concept of a system, if we only accept the perfected systems, the ones being good in their own terms, as truthfull [to be systems], because this is precisely the most interesting part of this whole activity, to find within them the point where they contradict themselves. But one after the other in the right order:

Method of systematization [in five stages]

A - the view or description of a method, or way of thought as such.

This already presupposes something, but precisely not the system, but the thing to be systematized. This can be, for example: everyday-life reflections (with concepts like life, future, relationship to the world etc.); scientific knowledge; artistic activity; political and ethical values; faith in worldly or heavenly transcendence; interpretations of a word or an idea. All this is, as material, already there, and has in itself the form of a certain method, to capture something as a specific object of thought, and one could add others or subcategorize them (at which point there is no dirth of questions, like whether the mathematical method should be counted to the sciences, the arts or as something different by itself). But here we are just in a general phase of the collection of various discontents; here is, in a certain sense, a connection of various ways of thinking, but how they are connected is of yet not shown.

B - the discovery of the connection point(s) in its general conceptual structures

After I've found these various ways of thinking, I now try to see, if and if so how they are connected, and so a network of connections is forming, an only sometimes symmetrical graph (with enough loops and self-references [or one could even say self-symmetries]), that gives a first idea of the amount of connected concepts and ideas, that will have to be described in their [ways of] appearance. It's important to understand, that these connections are as naturally limited as the contents of their form; that the form is only a kind of self-description, being subject to the 5th limitation above, of a specific content, experienced in a specific way by a specific person (my self) with a specific general desire[ing] and a specific situational interest, with specific presupposed knowledge and horizon of reference and only certain things, that even appeared to me in this way. However: I see in this way, if I [compare] in this way the various ways, how contents of thought can appear towards me, a connection between these different kinds of intentional reference, different methods etc., in which way [= by way of these comparisons] I can then order and understand them [as ways of thought].

C - the schematization of form

Between these references I now think differences and equalities, and can therefore now think something about form itself. I can think for example about the question, in which way in these different ways of thinking a symbol may appear, and how this [idea of the symbol] is different, when I think mathematically, artistically or politically. And therefore I can find in these very narrow reference-connections of my particular forms [of my thinking] something like an idea, that, abstracted from these [forms], may only be applied back towards them, and which has the role, to characterize the points of determination of my own system of thought. In this way I can find common ideas, but also differences and schemata of difference, like it is for me, as one of the most important, the difference of imagination and desire (in opposition to the homogeneity of the popular idea of "emotion", which I don't share [(i.e. use)], because it cuts off various forms of imagination from each other without a clear idea, and mixes one of these parts, designated as irrational, with desire and therefore makes the connection with perception, which is in an opposition-connection with desire, [almost] inconceivable), and also other generally shared schemata like intuitive/subjective/objective (which is a tripartite schema for me, since Intuition is formed presubjectively [i.e. in a non-abstract desire]), or like the above described difference of what, how (essential and accidental) and who, in the what the I from the non-I, and in the I the named parts reality, imagination, desire and the form of thought, connecting them back together.

D - expansion of form

Insofar I now have such schemata, I try to put them together and expand them as general as possible. This means, that I expand this schema to the last pole of the (particular, always "mine") objects/experiences, that could fall under these concepts [of which the schema was made], so that in the end all possible things, which come to mind for this [concept], often multiple times ($\pi\alpha\nu$ λεγεται πολλαχως [(the idea of) everything is said multiple, in lue of Aristotles $\sigma\nu$ λεγεται πολλαχως, (the idea of) the being is said multiple], as a concept of everything, but also in every thing itself under it). That by this, many multitudes of impressions [connected together by a similar superficial experience] fall apart from another as not different [internally in each grouping⁶, is necessary in this categorization of a way of thought; and indeed it seems impossible to me, to not think one or the other thing multiple times, and to leave other things aside, precisely because the concept of that, what I can think, is in its content reduced from that, what I can think, itself [by merit of being a _concept_] (precisely reduced by that, which I can think, but can't think of as something, that I can think, and that [all together] still only if I could think all of that together, mostly however only a very small portion of it). Still, in a certain sense it contains "the whole" [, "everything"], namely as the unit of all contents, that become conceivable by the methods, that were to be understood (at least [this unity] understood as a concept [in turn]).

E - presentation and contradiction (aporia)

Now I must present all of this, and have the problem, that I have to present this nicely [internally] connected thought in a sequence of letters or of spoken words, or at most, (which I am not even much talented in), in two or three dimensions, but never in the depth of the connection, that an abstract thought has. Because of that, I plow a way through the system, and describe for example the quadripartite self-image of the self (ουσια, νοησις, ερωσ και λογος) as a way in the way described above, first the essence as not-understanding-myself, then the forms of noesis/imagination, finally the desire and then the connecting idea / form of thinking as a resumee (which every fourth one would be [if chosen as such], even though not every one would be equally suited to be that, to allow for the descriptions of the other [three] in their references to each other; at most, in this specific constellation of concepts, it would work in precisely the opposite order). In any way, I do present it, and this text includes then, in this way, if explicitly or implicitly, a dialogical structure. Every way from one to the other point is stabilized by injections, why not to stop, why not to go to a different point, why at all to talk about this, and so the strictest system is full of gaps and question marks, until at the end nothing more can remain but aporia. One can say, that in this way, after another contentusl review and eventual openness, every moment of thought, if it is actually thought (and not just hinted at) is present at least thrice: first as an answer, secondly as a question, and finally as a problem; and mediating between them is verification (of the adequacy of the answer to the question and the other way around) and justification (of the line of questioning towards the problem, which it is designed from).

As one can see, this "systematic" method, which I mean quite seriously in its application, cannot be seriously presented as a search for unquestionability, because the result will always be aporetic. This, however, is nothing but the statement, that the system is open, needs additions, not, that it was wrong in that, what it arranged., but only, that the categorization in its schematism wasn't general enough, Every other result, which collides with this particular-system, can and must bring it down as a whole; but the first three steps, namely the partial elements in their universal construction, remain, and can be supplemented, relating to the schematization and the new material, which can blow open certain schemata, but not the old experiences and their conceptual descriptions, but only their relative evaluation against each other - without having to start unmediated [or suddenly] at the [immediate] questiona [(see phase A)] without any distinct answer. And it is in this precise way, that from the history of systematic and non-systematic philosophy alike, I can take elements for my project and put them to use: not in their last descriptions, but in their specific forms of thought and from that developable and in my own mind to be reborn forms of thought, their differences and from that to be developed schemata of mind, world and being.

(Thus systematicity ultimately as an ironic project - the creation of new systems, as others are unavailable, for the goal, to prove oneself wrong and to supercede ...)